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Central Bank Autonomy in Latin America:
A Survey and Case Studies
Harout Jack Samra*
There is no subtler, no surer means of overturning the existing basis
of society than to debauch the currency. The process engages all the
hidden forces of economic law on the side of destruction, and does it in
a manner which not one man in a million is able to diagnose.
– John Maynard Keynes1

INTRODUCTION
Beads of sweat forming on his furrowed brow, an
uncharacteristically anxious Hugo Chavez appeared on television
from the Miraflores Palace early in the morning of December 3,
2007.2 For a nation accustomed to seeing its bombastic president
sing the praises of his “Bolivarian” Revolution, Chavez struck the
pose of a leader under siege. Though many experts had
speculated that the sweeping constitutional amendments he had
proposed a mere two months earlier might fail, amendments
which would have wrought far-reaching changes on Venezuela,
few were prepared for the political theatre which ensued when
they actually did.3 Given Chavez’s seeming grasp on all the
levers of Venezuelan power, many observers noted that the
proposed amendments, collectively referred to as the Reforma de
la Constitución de la República Bolivariana de Venezuela (the
Reforma), would all but make him the latest in a long line of
Latin American caudillos that litter the region’s history.4

* International litigation and arbitration associate at Squire, Sanders & Dempsey
L.L.P. J.D., magna cum laude, May 2009, University of Miami School of Law; M.B.A.,
May 2008, University of Miami School of Business Administration; B.A., cum laude,
University of Miami, December 2004. I want to thank Professor Stanley Langbein for his
patience and dedication and R. Scott Nuzum, Jordan Dresnick, and Natalie Rico for their
valuable advice.
1 JOHN MAYNARD KEYNES, THE ECONOMIC CONSEQUENCES OF PEACE 236 (1920).
2 See Simon Romero, Venezuela Vote Sets Roadblocks on Chávez Path, N.Y. TIMES,
Dec. 4, 2007, at A1.
3 Editorial, Not so Fast, Venezuelans Warn Chavez, ST. PETERSBURG TIMES, Dec. 8,
2007, at 16A.
4 See Roger Cohen, Op-Ed, Democracy In the Americas, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 6, 2007, at
A41. See also ANDRÉS OPPENHEIMER, CUENTOS CHINOS 223–63 (2005); Mario GarciaSerra, The “Enabling Law”: The Demise of the Separation of Powers in Hugo Chavez’s
Venezuela, 32 U. MIAMI INTER-AM. L. REV. 265, 266 (2001). A caudillo is defined as:
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In its coverage of the referendum, the media largely focused
on the abandonment of term limits for the president, which many
suggested would result in Chavez becoming a president for life.5
In addition to term limits, the Reforma also included sweeping
changes to several important governmental institutions, such as
the military and the central bank, the Banco Central de
Venezuela.6 Indeed, the Reforma explicitly provided for the
abolition of central bank independence.7 Had the Reforma
passed, proposed Article 318 would have provided the following,
in part: The National Executive authority, through the Banco
Central de Venezuela, acting in strict and obligatory coordination,
will determine the monetary policies and will exert the monetary
authority of the National Power.8
While the scope of this effort is not limited to the
“Bolivarian” travails of Mr. Chavez, this episode makes one fact
plain: the independence of central banking authorities in the
various Latin American states is frequently the subject of great
political upheaval. Indeed, the drastic political turmoil that has
long been endemic to the region has also led to frequent and
radical policy changes in this central state function.9 Whether
labeled “neoliberal” or “Washington Consensus,” many of the
policies advocated for in this paper are not without precedent in
the region—and they certainly are capable of arousing significant
passion and controversy at the hands of populist leaders. Indeed,
Professor Felipe Larrain of the Pontificia Universidad Catolica

A Latin American military dictator. In the wake of the Latin American
independence movement in the early 19th century, politically unstable
conditions and the long experience of armed conflict led to the emergence in
many of the new countries of strongmen who were often charismatic and whose
hold on power depended on control over armed followers, patronage, and
vigilance. Because their power was based on violence and personal relations,
the legitimacy of the caudillos’ rule was always in doubt, and few could
withstand the challenges of new leaders who emerged among their own
followers and wealthy patrons.
ENCYCLOPÆDIA BRITANNICA ONLINE (2009), available at http://www.britannica.com/
EBchecked/topic/100372/caudillo.
5 Chris Kraul, Venezuelan Voters Reject Bid by Chavez to Extend Powers, L.A.
TIMES, Dec. 3, 2007, at A1.
6 Id.
7 It must be noted that the terms central bank “autonomy” and “independence” are
used interchangeably throughout this paper.
8 La Reforma de la Constitución de la Républica Bolivariana de Venezuela (2007)
[hereinafter “La Reforma”]. Article 318 of La Reforma reads as follows: “El Poder
Ejecutivo Nacional, a través del Banco Central de Venezuela, en estricta y obligatoria
coordinación, fijará las políticas monetarias y ejercerá las competencias monetarias del
Poder Nacional.” All translations of Article 318 are by the author.
9 See, e.g., Luis Jácome H., Legal Central Bank Independence and Inflation in Latin
America During the 1990s, 4 (IMF, Working Paper No. 01/212 2001), available at
http://www.imf.org/external/pubs/ft/wp/2001/wp01212.pdf.
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de Chile pointedly noted that while Latin America has made
great strides in controlling inflation, the fact that two of the
region’s largest economies, Venezuela and Argentina, have
returned to double-digit inflation rates of around 20% and 10%,
respectively, is deeply troubling and has “led some pundits to
wonder whether high inflation—and even hyperinflation—may
be on its way back to Latin America.”10 Further, even though the
renowned Larrain noted the present absence of many of the
historical causes of hyperinflation, he nevertheless seemed to
strike a dark note, referring particularly to the case of Chavez’s
Venezuela:
The true risk of high inflation in Latin America lies in populism. It is
no coincidence that Venezuela is the country with the highest rate of
inflation in the region—though low by historical standards. Hugo
Chavez, Venezuela’s president, is the face of Latin American
populism, though of a different brand; a rare mix of socialism and
populism for export which can be sustained without an explosion of
inflation as long as oil-related fiscal revenues remain generous. If
that situation changes—and it will when the international cycle
turns—the risk of high inflation is at the door. Hyperinflation is not
dead, it is merely sleeping. Leaders such as Zimbabwe’s Robert
Mugabe are capable of awakening the monster.11

This ominous warning is perhaps all the more terrifying given
the knowledge that Larrain’s expectation that energy prices
would fall in the short term has indeed come to pass. Are we
merely waiting at this stage for the other shoe to drop?
Central bank autonomy, most scholars agree, is a sine qua
non of monetary or price stability.12 Recent scholarship has
divided this pillar of economic stability into two categories: de
jure and de facto sovereignty.13 Clearly, while this study will
disproportionately focus on formal legal structures that have
been or may be put into place in order to provide for independent
monetary judgment, such formalism often fails to truly explain
the full extent of political interference in the central bank
decision-making processes. A state may have a finely crafted
legal structure in place that, while perfect in form, fails utterly in
function. It is with this understanding that I shall consider
several important case studies focusing on Latin America. Over
the last two decades, reforms strengthening central bank
10

at 176.

Felipe Larrain, The Spectre of Latin American Inflation, THE BANKER, Sept., 2007

Id.
Agustín Carstens & Luis Jácome H., Latin American Central Bank Reform:
Progress and Challenges, 6 (IMF, Working Paper No. 05/114 2005), available at
http://www.imf.org/external/pubs/ft/wp/2005/wp05114.pdf.
13 See, e.g., id.
11
12
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autonomy have been implemented throughout the region.
Between the late 1980s and 1990s, for example, numerous
countries in the region made such reforms, including Chile
(1989), El Salvador (1991), Argentina (1992), Colombia (1992),
Venezuela (1992), Ecuador (1992 and 1998), Peru (1993), Mexico
(1993), Bolivia (1995), Costa Rica (1995), Uruguay (1995),
Paraguay (1995), Honduras (1996) and Nicaragua (1999).14 By
highlighting several of these reforms, I hope to outline the
existing trends in the region.
Following this brief introduction, Section I of this study will
provide a comprehensive review of the economic literature
relating to the economic benefits of central bank independence,
including a description of the various models and methods
economists have used to analyze the issue. Section II will consist
of three shorter case studies from the region, specifically
addressing the central bank structures that have been adopted in
Argentina, Chile, and Mexico. In each case, recent central bank
policy shifts will be addressed and placed in historical context.
Section III will return to the issue of the Venezuelan
amendments proposed by Mr. Chavez. In addition to presenting
a detailed analysis of the banking amendments that were offered
and rejected by the public, this section will also discuss the
aftermath of that stunning electoral rejection and the current
state of affairs in Venezuela. Finally, the conclusion will place
Venezuela in the broader context of the region and discuss the
general trends that seem to be forming throughout Latin
America.
I. CENTRAL BANK INDEPENDENCE AND PRICE STABILITY
A. The Scourge of Inflation
Prior to discussing the economic literature on the correlation
between central bank autonomy and price stability, it is worth
stepping back for a moment and discussing inflation as a
phenomenon in itself. I will soon discuss the trade-off faced by
monetary decision makers between short-term growth and
longer-term inflation, and the balance that central bankers or
monetary authorities must seek to achieve between these two.
However, pointing to the destructive capacity of this economic
phenomenon, the eminent economist Milton Friedman noted,
“inflation is a disease, a dangerous and sometimes fatal disease,
a disease that, if not checked in time, can destroy a society.”15
14
15

(1994).

Jácome, supra note 9, at 6.
MILTON FRIEDMAN, MONEY MISCHIEF: EPISODES IN MONETARY HISTORY 191
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Indeed, referring to Bolivia, Brazil, and Argentina, Friedman
noted that Latin America is hardly a stranger to catastrophic
hyperinflation in the modern era.16 Looking over the history of
the region, he noted that hyperinflations in Chile, Brazil, and
Argentina imposed broad political and social costs, including the
establishment of military governments in the mid-twentieth
century.17
More recently, Friedman asserted, “repeated
inflations in Brazil . . . in the 1980s have led to the repeated
unsuccessful ‘reforms,’ the replacement of governments, flights of
capital, and heightened economic instability.”18
As to the proximate cause of inflation, Friedman noted that
“[t]here is probably no other proposition in economics that is as
well established as” the principle that “[i]nflation occurs when
the quantity of money rises appreciably more rapidly than
output, and the more rapid the rise in quantity of money per unit
of output, the greater the rate of inflation.”19 The fundamental
challenge embedded in this dilemma, however, is the fact that
“[o]utput is limited by the physical and human resources
available and by the degree of knowledge and capacity for using
those resources,” whereas “modern forms of money—paper and
bookkeeping entries—are subject to no such physical limits.”20
Pointing to the Brazilian experience between 1965 and 1989
during which the quantity of money per unit of output correlated
quite closely with the high rate of inflation, Friedman noted that
“the price level at the end [was] nearly 6 million times the level
at the beginning—an average of 86.5 percent a year.”21
Considering the Brazilian dilemma, Friedman predicted that the
country would not be able to operate at such “hyperinflationary
rates without abandoning its national currency and adopting a
substitute.”22 Indeed, in the subsequent years, the government
would adopt several substitutes in its long and painful journey
back to price stability.23
B. The Centrality of Central Bank Independence
B.W. Fraser, the former Governor of the Reserve Bank of
Australia, perhaps summed up the importance of central bank
independence most effectively when he noted, “price stability is

16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23

Id.
Id. at 192.
Id.
Id. at 193.
Id. at 193–94.
Id. at 199.
Id. at 200.
Id.
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generally considered a good thing, and . . . an independent
central bank can help to achieve it. I do not need to dwell on the
desirability of price stability.
Economies work better if
investment and wage decisions are not confused and thwarted by
high inflation.”24
Further emphasizing the importance of
mitigating inflation, Fraser added, “some people see price
stability as an anchor not only for the economy, but also for
society at large.”25 He emphasized, however, that keeping prices
stable is “not the natural order of things in a modern economy.”26
Several centuries earlier, the eminent British economist
David Ricardo advocated for greater independence for monetary
authorities.27 In his Plan for the Establishment of a National
Bank, Ricardo made plain his lack of confidence in political
decision-making in the arena of monetary policy:
It is said that Government could not be safely entrusted with the
power of issuing paper money; that it would most certainly abuse it;
and that, on any occasion when it was pressed for money to carry on a
war, it would cease to pay coin, on demand, for its notes; and from
that moment the currency would become a forced Government paper.
There would, I confess, be great danger of this, if Government—as
that is to say, the Ministers—were themselves to be entrusted with
the power of issuing paper money. But I propose to place this trust in
the hands of Commissioners, not removable from their official
situation but by a vote of one or both Houses of Parliament. I propose
also to prevent all intercourse between these Commissioners and
Ministers, by forbidding every species of money transaction between
them. The Commissioners should never, on any pretence, lend money
to Government, nor be in the slightest degree under its control or
influence. Over Commissioners so entirely independent of them, the
Ministers would have much less power than they now possess over the
Bank Directors. Experience shows how little this latter body have
been able to withstand the cajolings of Ministers; and how frequently
they have been induced to increase their advances on exchequer bills
and treasury bills, at the very moment they were themselves
declaring that it would be attended with the greatest risk to the
stability of their establishment, and to the public interest. . . . I ask,
then, whether the country would not possess a greater security
against all such influence, over the minds of the issuers of paper, as
would induce them to swerve from the strict line of their duty, if the
paper money of the country were issued by Commissioners, on the
plan I have proposed, rather than by the Bank of England, as at

24 B.W. Fraser, Central Bank Independence: What Does It Mean?, RES. BANK OF
AUSTL. BULL. 1, 2 (1994), available at http://www.rba.gov.au/PublicationsAndResearch/
Bulletin/bu_dec94/bu_1294_1.pdf.
25 Id.
26 Id. (emphasis in original).
27 Id. at 1.
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present constituted? If Government wanted money, it should be
obliged to raise it in the legitimate way; by taxing the people; by the
issue and sale of exchequer bills, by funded loans, or by borrowing
from any of the numerous banks which might exist in the country; but
in no case should it be allowed to borrow from those who have the
power of creating money.28

Other economists, including John Maynard Keynes, later
adopted similar views to Ricardo’s as to the benefits of central
bank independence.29 Further, modern empirical analysis has
largely affirmed Ricardo’s prescience. Such analysis has shed
much light on the real, measurable impact of a central bank
beholden to politically motivated actors.
Echoing Ricardo, Federal Reserve Board Chairman Ben
Bernanke explained “[t]hat central bank independence promotes
lower inflation in developed countries is well-established by the
economic literature.”30 An insufficiently independent central
bank, he added, “may be forced to ease policy inappropriately to
reduce the financing costs of government debt or to help re-elect
incumbents.”31
Pointing to Latin America in particular,
Bernanke noted that “[i]n the late 1980s and early 1990s, several
countries took steps to enhance central bank independence, both
through constitutional provisions, and through changes in the
central bank law.”32 It must be noted, however, that he added
the following caveat: “Although the evidence for developing
countries is more mixed, several studies have found that central
bank independence promotes low inflation in those countries as
well, especially when de facto rather than de jure measures of
independence are used.”33 Indeed, Bernanke noted that this
distinction is particularly important in Latin America and to
convey his point more effectively, he gave the example of Brazil:
[A]lthough a number of features of Brazilian law promote the
independence of the nation’s central bank, the bank’s de facto
independence may be limited by the power of the president to remove
members of the Monetary Policy Committee. However, the fact that
the left-of-center Lula administration in Brazil has been able to
support disciplined monetary and fiscal policies without significant

28 DAVID RICARDO, PLAN FOR THE ESTABLISHMENT OF A NATIONAL BANK (1824),
reprinted in THE WORKS OF DAVID RICARDO 506–07 (J.R. McCulloch ed., 1871).
29 Fraser, supra note 24 at 1.
30 Ben S. Bernanke, Chairman, Fed. Reserve Sys., Inflation in Latin America: A New
Era?, Remarks at the Stanford Institute for Economic Policy Research Economic Summit,
(Feb. 11, 2005) (transcript available at http://www.federalreserve.gov/BoardDocs/
Speeches/2005/20050211/default.htm).
31 Id.
32 Id.
33 Id. See infra Part I.D for a discussion of the use of de facto and de jure measures
of independence.
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loss of popularity is itself testimony to the degree that such policies
are becoming more widely accepted in the region.34

Generally, however, Bernanke’s overt endorsement of broad
central bank independence, coupled with his lauding of the Lula
administration’s monetary policy, follows to a large degree from
his broader conclusion that policies such as this were largely
responsible for the achievement of price stability in Latin
America during the 1990s.35
Scholars have summarized the theoretical economic
literature as essentially asserting three broad arguments to
explain why greater independence in monetary decision making
yields lower inflation rates.36
First, is the premise that
government financial decision makers will tend to exert
“pressure on monetary authorities to relax monetary
conditions.”37 This is largely due to the fact that “[r]estrictive
monetary policy worsens the fiscal position of the government
through a reduction in seigniorage revenue, increase in the
interest burden of the debt, and lower tax receipts because of the
temporary economic slowdown.”38 The second argument is based
on the premise that “a central bank enjoying economic
independence will force the government to reduce the deficit”
rather than being “forced to finance government deficits by
printing money.”39 The third and perhaps most influential line of
argument is quite different as it relates to time-inconsistency
issues.40 Governments, it asserts, have short-term objectives
which are frequently inconsistent with longer-term objectives.
A timely example follows: In the event that a government
attempts to stimulate the economy through a monetary
expansion, the likely future cost is higher inflation.41 The
argument continues by noting that a “[l]ack of credibility in the
government commitment to the announced inflation objective
leads rational economic agents to demand a risk premium to
compensate for this inflationary bias.”42 After all, it was
reasonably assumed that “governments facing a trade-off

Id.
See id.
Eva Gutiérrez, Inflation Performance and Constitutional Central Bank
Independence: Evidence From Latin America and the Caribbean 1, 4 (IMF, Working Paper
No. 03/53, 2003), available at https://www.imf.org/external/pubs/ft/wp/2003/wp0353.pdf
(discussion drawing from the work of Eijffinger & de Haan).
37 Id.
38 Id.
39 Id. at 5.
40 Id.
41 Id.
42 Id.
34
35
36
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between inflation and unemployment are tempted to choose
higher-than-optimal inflation rates.”43 The policy response to
this is clear: by delegating monetary policy to a conservative
central bank, independent of more politically sensitive decision
makers, the risk premium can be mitigated through a more
credible commitment to future inflation objectives.44
Others are far more willing to ascribe less benevolent
motives to political actors. Fraser noted that “cynics,” whose
skepticism he did not equally share, might also blame the
inflation bias on the political process itself.45 Such “cynics” would
assert that “politicians have short time horizons, stretching only
as far as the next election.”46 Indeed, Fraser outlined the
“treadmill of a political business cycle” as follows:
[W]here interest rates are eased prior to an election to generate strong
growth around election time, and the inflation does not surface until
after the election. After the election, interest rates are raised, thereby
perpetuating a boom/bust cycle. In this story, even politicians who
understand that there is no long-term trade-off between inflation and
economic activity are drawn irresistibly to the short-term trade-off.
Independent and longsighted central bankers are needed to rescue
politicians from this temptation.47

This view of politicians as “single-minded seekers of reelection”
has received a significant amount of attention in political science
scholarship.48 While Fraser disclaims this view, noting that he is
“less cynical about politicians generally,” he nevertheless adds,
as others have concluded, that “there is an inherent bias in policy
making which pushes policy makers towards a trade-off point
which is soft on inflation.”49 Explaining this phenomenon, Fraser
noted that “policy is determined and implemented under
conditions of great uncertainty,” and “[i]t is this uncertainty . . .
which can inject an inflationary bias into the policy making
process.”50 He colorfully notes, “[t]hey may be reluctant to take
away the punchbowl just when the party gets going—that
unpopular task which the Governor of the U.S. Fed from 1951 to

43 Luis I. Jácome & Francisco Vázquez, Any Link Between Legal Central Bank
Independence and Inflation? Evidence from Latin America and the Caribbean 1, 3 (IMF,
Working Paper No. 05/75, 2005), available at http://www.imf.org/external/pubs/
ft/wp/2005/wp0575.pdf.
44 Id.
45 See Fraser, supra note 24 at 2–3.
46 Id. at 2.
47 Id. at 3.
48 See, e.g., DAVID R. MAYHEW, CONGRESS: THE ELECTORAL CONNECTION 17 (2d ed.
1974).
49 Fraser, supra note 24 at 3.
50 Id.
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1970, William McChesney Martin, said was the duty of central
bankers.”51
Interestingly, many scholars have also noted that while an
independent central bank must, to some degree, be willing to say
“no” to political actors in order to maintain its integrity and
freedom, it nevertheless derives its independence from a willing
delegation by the people’s representatives.52 Indeed, Jeffrey
Fuhrer, the former Vice President of the Federal Reserve Bank of
Boston, noted that the integral question is not whether there
should or should not be any political influence on central banking
decisions, but what constitutes “undue” political pressure.53
Pointing to prior research, Fuhrer cogently added that “a central
bank cannot and should not maintain long-term independence
from political pressure if it consistently acts contrary to the will
of the electorate.”54 This balance is a complex one to achieve and
not without significant drawbacks. Fuhrer illustrates the time
inconsistency problem through an effective illustration: “The
situation is analogous to the lenient parent who, observing that
the misbehaving child’s misdeed is done and cannot be undone,
decides not to punish the child. The result might be that the
child misbehaves more often than the parent would like.”55
Perhaps surprisingly, and adding to the complexity of this issue,
studies have shown that the “median voter” would prefer a
“central banker more inflation averse than himself,” while also
preferring to remain “time inconsistent.”56
Empirical
research
on
the
relationship
between
independence and price stability has yielded a complex but fairly
consistent correlation. Lawrence Summers and Alberto Alesina’s
research demonstrated a “strong negative relationship between
inflation variability and central bank independence.”57 Another
study, published by the Federal Reserve Bank of Cleveland
identified central bank independence as a “key factor” in
Id.
Gutiérrez, supra note 36 at 5; see also generally Sylvester C. W. Eijffinger & Jakob
de Haan, The Political Economy of Central-Bank Independence, 19 PRINCETON INT’L FIN.
SEC. (1996) (referring to a pithy quote from The Economist which noted that “[t]he only
good central bank is one that can say no to politicians”).
53 Jeffrey C. Fuhrer, Central Bank Independence and Inflation Targeting: Monetary
Policy Paradigms for the Next Millennium?, NEW ENG. ECON. REV. 19, 20 (Jan./Feb.
1997).
54 Id.
55 Id.
56 Alberto Alesina & Lawrence H. Summers, Central Bank Independence and
Macroeconomic Performance: Some Comparative Evidence, 25 J. MONEY, CREDIT &
BANKING 151, 151–52 (1993).
57 Id. at 154. The research, however, also showed that there was no demonstrable
correlation between central bank independence and the level of variability of economic
growth. Id.
51
52
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maintaining price stability.58 Pointing to the case of New
Zealand’s extraordinary success in curbing inflation in the latter
half of the twentieth century, the authors asserted that the
passage of the Reserve Bank of New Zealand Act in 1989 was the
key turning point in accomplishing this because it incorporated
two fundamental reforms: “First, it gave the Reserve Bank
greater independence from the central government. Second, it
established an explicit inflation target, becoming the first of
many countries to do so. Once considered the least independent
of central banks, New Zealand’s now ranks among the more
independent ones.”59 Extrapolating based on the experience of
New Zealand, the authors assert that because other nations
followed New Zealand’s example, “increased independence is,
perhaps, responsible for a decline of nearly two percentage points
in the average inflation rate for the industrialized nations as a
whole.”60 The empirical results that the study provides are quite
striking and clearly argue in favor of greater independence.
Attempting to estimate what prior level inflation would have
been had the New Zealand central bank been more independent
earlier in the century, the authors noted, “holding all else equal,
if New Zealand in the earlier time period had an independence
score as high as today’s, then the annual inflation rate would
have been 3.4% instead of the 7.6% that actually occurred”
during the period from 1955–1988.61 During that earlier period,
the Reserve Bank of New Zealand was essentially an arm of the
financial ministry, and the country’s monetary policy was largely
at the finance minister’s discretion.62
Taking a broader perspective, the authors also draw the
sweeping conclusion “that holding everything else equal, the
increase in central banks’ independence would have lowered the
average inflation rate worldwide from 5.6% to 3.8%.”63 While the
authors concede that independence was not the only factor at
play in these reductions of inflation rates and that the impact of
central bank independence is more mercurial in the case of
developing nations, they nevertheless conclude that “[a]n
independent central bank is a government’s most effective way to
ensure delivery of a low inflation rate. Furthermore, nearly 2
percentage points of developed countries’ average decline in
58 Charles T. Carlstrom & Timothy S. Fuerst, Central Bank Independence: The Key
to Price Stability?, ECON. COMMENT. (Fed. Res. Bank of Clev., Cleveland, Ohio), Sept. 1,
2006.
59 Id. at 1.
60 Id.
61 Id. at 2.
62 Id.
63 Id.
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inflation over time is the direct results [sic] of their central
banks’ increased independence.”64
C. The Arguments Against Central Bank Autonomy
While the arguments, both theoretical and empirical, in
favor of central bank autonomy have largely won the day among
economists, several factions still stand in stark opposition to
what they label the “neoliberal” economic agenda, which they
assert incorporates central bank autonomy as one of its central
tenets.65 That the term “neoliberalism” has attained nearpejorative status in certain Latin American quarters is
undeniable. Indeed, to a large degree it has become a rallying
cry for aspiring despots, self-styled anti-imperialists, and
populists throughout the region.66 This backlash has, to some
extent, been the result of failed or poorly executed economic
reforms put in place by various Latin American states over the
last half-century. It has also provided a ready basis upon which
populist leaders have manipulated the bleak economic disparities
endemic in the region. Few Latin American leaders have been
quite as successful at this sort of bluster as Hugo Chavez.
In an intense critique of the “neoliberal” economic order,
Dean Timothy Canova pointedly asserts that “[c]entral bank
autonomy is a particularly sacrosanct foundation of today’s global
economic order that undermines peace and stability.”67 In a line
of argument familiar to Latin America observers, he goes on to
say, “[i]n reality, central bank autonomy is a euphemism for the
capture of monetary policy by interested private banking and
financial interests—it is a capture intentionally designed by
law.”68 Indeed, it is based on this perceived oligarchic conspiracy
that Canova makes the following dire prediction:
The Neoliberal State is destined to fail in providing peace and
prosperity for all precisely because central bank autonomy ensures
that monetary and economic policies will favor the few over the many.
The empirical evidence bears this out. Real interest rates remain at
the highest sustained level of the century, and this remains one of the
least recognized causes of today’s top heavy distribution of wealth and
income both directly, by redistributing income from debtors to
creditors, and indirectly, by keeping down the real wage rate in many

Id. at 3.
See, e.g., Timothy A. Canova, Financial Liberalization, International Monetary
Dis/order, and the Neoliberal State, 15 AM. U. INT’L L. REV. 1279 (2000).
66 PLINIO APULEYO MENDOZA, CARLOS ALBERTO MONTANER & ALVARO VARGAS
LLOSA, GUIDE TO THE PERFECT LATIN AMERICAN IDIOT 66–71 (Michael Lajda Ames trans.,
2001).
67 See Canova, supra note 65, at 1294.
68 Id.
64
65
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industries, thereby reinforcing the hierarchies of power that dominate
the modern corporation . . . . The neoliberal state is one that dashes
hopes and dreams on a mass scale, and silently impoverishes the
public sector, while delivering great wealth to a small minority of
global citizens.69

As was mentioned above, however, such arguments are hardly
unusual in modern era Latin American politics. Their nearubiquity is underscored in Plinio Apuleyo Mendoza, Carlos
Alberto Montaner and Alvaro Vargas Llosa’s groundbreaking
study of Latin American populism, The Guide to the Perfect Latin
American Idiot.70
According to the authors, the perfect idiot “resorts to the old
dichotomy of the left against the right, trusting that a purely
semantic or emotional factor can tilt the scale in his favor. His is
the old scholastic stratagem of vilifying anyone who questions his
dogma. Neoliberalism is an anathema the idiot is trying to lodge
into the public conscience through frenzied repetition, as was
done in the Middle Ages with heresies.”71 Describing the mindset
of their perfect idiot, the authors add, “in the subsurface of his
feeble political training (a mixture of Marxist Vulgate and
populism), has remained the idea that a businessman is an
exploiter, getting rich off the labor of others.”72
Referring specifically to the perfect idiot’s view of monetary
policy and judgment, Mendoza, Montaner and Llosa note that the
idiot “believes that [monetary issuance as a way of reactivating
demand and making up for the shortage of resources] is also a
means not only of development but of what he defines, with
grandiloquent pomposity, as social investment. He’s a friend of
the great money-printing machine. And he considers the policies
dedicated to assuring sound money as reactionary, neoliberal,
and contrary to popular interests.”73 As we shall see, infra, these
are the very goals that Mr. Chavez outlined for his “reformed”
central bank.74 Indeed, the authors note, the idiot’s policies have
been “catastrophic”75 for the region. They add, “[i]n this case, the
fox in the henhouse is not the businessman but the state, which
is plucking the chickens mercilessly.”76

69
70
71
72
73
74
75
76

Id. at 1301–04.
See generally MENDOZA, MONTANER & VARGAS LLOSA, supra note 66.
Id. at 67.
Id. at 68–69.
Id. at 69.
See infra Part III.B.
See MENDOZA, MONTANER & VARGAS LLOSA, supra note 66, at 69.
Id.
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Along these lines, Milton Friedman offered the following
scathing critique of the populist view of neoliberal reforms,
especially the protection of central bank independence from
political interference:
No government willingly accepts the responsibility for producing
inflation even in moderate degree, let alone at hyperinflationary rates.
Government officials always find some excuse—greedy businessmen,
grasping trade unions, spendthrift consumers, Arab sheikhs, bad
weather, or anything else that seems remotely plausible. No doubt
businessmen are greedy, trade unions are grasping, consumers are
spendthrifts, Arab sheikhs have raised the price of oil, and the
weather is often bad. Any of these can produce high prices for
individual items; they cannot produce rising prices for goods in
general. . . . [T]hey cannot produce continuing inflation, for a very
simple reason: not one of the alleged culprits possesses a printing
press on which it can legally turn out those pieces of paper we carry in
our pockets and call money.77

While later scholars such as Summers and Alesina asserted that
this broad confidence in the power of the monetary was
somewhat misplaced,78 the essential truth behind Friedman’s
assertion is undeniable: none of the conspirators that populist
demagogues would blame for all their countries’ ills can actually
print their own money, of which engaging in excessively, whether
it be in the context of military conflict or economic upheaval, is
most often the true cause of massive, debilitating inflation.
Indeed, given the collective Latin American experience over
the last half-century, what is perhaps most striking about the
sorts of arguments advanced by Professor Canova is their dogged
persistence. It is, in part, this challenge that caused Fed
Chairman Ben Bernanke to strike a more cautious note when he
stated the following about the recent progress in Latin America:
Worldviews tend to evolve slowly, and it is far too soon to claim that
ideas and politics in Latin America have changed fundamentally or
irrevocably. Nevertheless, during the past fifteen years or so, both the
political elites and the broader public in the region have, for the most
part, shown an increased willingness to abandon the failed economic
models of earlier decades in favor of new approaches that emphasize
improved fiscal discipline, the benefits of free trade and free markets,
and the vital importance of building strong economic institutions.79

There can be little doubt that Bernanke’s caution was amply
justified and to a large degree the economic policies advanced by
Mr. Chavez and his allies in the region (including Bolivian

77
78
79

See FRIEDMAN, supra note 15, at 192.
See generally Alesina & Summers, supra note 56.
See Bernanke, supra note 30.
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President Evo Morales, Ecuadorian President Rafael Correa, and
Nicaraguan President Daniel Ortega) underscore the lack of
consensus around free-market oriented policies, including central
bank autonomy.
D. Paradigms of Analysis
In order to more effectively study the issue of central bank
independence, scholars have divided the topic into several
categories that can be separated from one another to allow for
better comparison and analysis. Understanding these categories
allows for a more precise definition of specifically what is meant
by the term independence in the legal context. To a large degree,
much of the modern analysis of central bank autonomy has
accepted the fact that not all independence, as the expression
goes, is equal.80 Even the most perfect legal structure can fail
utterly in delivering the policy objectives it was crafted to
achieve. Perhaps no region has stood in testament to this fact to
a greater degree than Latin America. Thus, merely considering
formal legal structures in order to determine the extent of a
central bank’s independent judgment is sorely inadequate. In
order to recognize this fundamental distinction, economists have
divided the broader concept of central bank independence into
two categories: de jure and de facto independence.81
Underscoring this distinction, as we shall see in the
subsequent section, central banks need not operate within the
high walls of a complex legal framework in order to be
substantively independent.
Beyond the more intuitive
distinction between de jure and de facto independence, scholars
have also divided the scope of a central bank’s actions into two
categories: goal and instrument independence.82 This distinction
addresses the scope of the bank’s responsibilities. Though one
can relate it, in a broader sense to the de jure and de facto
distinction, it ultimately rests on the explicit authority vested in
the institution itself. As we shall note, the goals of a national
central bank or monetary authority are frequently outlined
within the authorizing laws of that institution. That, for
example, a central bank is guided by elected officials to dedicate
itself to the maintenance of a low rate of inflation, or perhaps
conversely, a lower rate of unemployment, does not mean that
the political actors may affect the actual decision making
conducted by the institution in order to achieve that end. The

80
81
82

See, e.g., Jácome, supra note 9.
See infra Part I.D.1 for a detailed look at de jure and de facto independence.
See infra Part I.D.2 for a detailed look at goal and instrument independence.
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following sections shall provide a more detailed look at these two
sets of distinctions.
1. De Jure vs. De Facto Independence
The distinction between de jure and de facto independence
essentially rests upon the recognition that “central banks are
institutions that operate within government and not apart from
it . . . any attempt at legislating autonomy can never entirely
eliminate all potential sources of tension between the political
and monetary authorities.”83 The former Governor of the Reserve
Bank of Australia, B.W. Fraser, notes that in order to account for
the full complexities of central bank independence, studies must
account for this distinction.84
Citing to his experience in
Australia, Fraser asserts:
[L]egal independence, which is what the empirical studies seek to
measure, can be very different from practical independence. In
Australia, the legislation provides that in the event of a dispute over
monetary policy, the government can override the Reserve Bank by
tabling its objections before both houses of parliament. While this is
the legal position (which scores a negative on the index of
independence), such a situation has never arisen in practice; and
indexes of legal independence cannot capture the role of personalities
(such as the Governor and the Treasurer/Finance Minister) who fill in
the operational gaps in the relevant legislation. Nor can they capture
the changing policy-making environment. For example, the greater
reliance on market-based policies (rather than controls) in Australia
over the past decade has significantly enhanced the degree of
independence of the Reserve Bank, without any change in the Bank’s
charter.85

Fraser’s two examples underscore an important distinction
that has also arisen in Latin America. Very often, as in the case
of Brazil, a central bank may be able to act with a greater degree
of independence than otherwise provided for by the bank’s
founding legislation.86 On the other hand, however, there are
also clear instances, for example in Venezuela, where a bank
lacks the real, political authority to perform its responsibilities as
specifically outlined in such legislation.87 Luis Jácome provides a
more detailed explanation of the Brazil/Venezuela comparison:
[T]he Central Bank of Brazil (CBB) enjoys more effective than legal
independence as oppose [sic] to the Central Bank of Venezuela (CBV),

83 PIERRE L. SIKLOS, THE CHANGING FACE OF CENTRAL BANKING: EVOLUTIONARY
TRENDS SINCE WORLD WAR II 301 (2002).
84 Fraser, supra note 24, at 3.
85 Id. at 5.
86 See Jácome, supra note 9, at 20.
87 See id.
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which on many aspects is legally rather than effectively independent.
Regardless of the lack of legal clarity of the policy objective of the CBB
and of having no political independence—the government maintains a
majority in the National Monetary Council (presided by the Minister
of Finance) and the Executive branch carries legal support to directly
remove the President of the CBB—the government has granted the
CBB effective independence, which has been articulated through the
inflation targeting scheme in practice since 1999. On the other hand,
the CBV has been the subject of episodes of political interference that
have limited its legally assigned economic independence.
In
particular, the government imposed capital controls in the midst of
the banking crisis and obtained financing for the deposit insurance
fund, which adversely affected the conduct of monetary policy. In
addition, financial independence established by law has not been
followed in practice . . . while simultaneously the CBV has been
required to transfer to the government unrealized profits.88

To a large degree, Jácome’s comparison of the Brazilian and
Venezuelan experiences highlights the difficulty in capturing the
true extent to which a central bank is independent. Indeed, what
is all the more troubling about his example is that the degree to
which political actors have interfered with monetary policymaking since his study has only gotten worse in the case of
Venezuela and, some would argue, in Brazil as well.89
2. Goal Independence vs. Instrument Independence
In their article, How Independent Should a Central Bank
Be?, Debelle and Fischer noted that “it is useful to draw a
distinction between goal independence and instrument
independence.”90 Goal independence, which the authors relate to
Grilli, Masciandaro, and Tabellini’s earlier concept of political
independence, exists when the central bank is free to set the final
goals of monetary policy.91 Along these lines, a central bank
would be acting independently in this regard if it could, “for
instance, decide that price stability was less important than
output stability and act accordingly.”92 On the other hand, the
authors assert, “[a] bank that has instrument independence is

See id. at 20–22.
See, e.g., Iuri Dantas, Banco do Brasil Insists on Independence; Cheap Loans,
BLOOMBERG.COM, Apr. 28, 2009, http://www.bloomberg.com/apps/news?pid
=20601086&sid=axCOPPNzm1o8&refer=latin_america; John Fitzpatrick, Brazil: Lula
Starts to Throw His Weight Around, GRINGOES.COM, Apr. 15, 2009, http://www.gringoes
.com/articles.asp?ID_Noticia=2272.
90 Guy Debelle & Stanley Fischer, How Independent Should a Central Bank Be?, in
GOALS, GUIDELINES, AND CONSTRAINTS FACING MONETARY POLICYMAKERS 197 (Jeffrey C.
Fuhrer ed., 1994).
91 Id.
92 Id.
88
89
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free to choose the means by which it seeks to achieve its goals.”93
By way of a previous example, which Debelle and Fischer also
cite, the Reserve Bank of New Zealand, “whose goals are
precisely described in a contract with the government, has no
goal independence; however, it has instrument independence
since it chooses the method by which it tries to achieve the preassigned goals.”94
Jeffrey Fuhrer of the Federal Reserve Bank of Boston briefly
outlines the two concepts, noting that “[g]oal independence
allows the central bank to set its own ultimate goals (price
stability, stable employment, and so on) and instrument
independence allows the central bank to decide how best to
achieve those goals.”95 Professor Carl Walsh provides a more
expansive summary of this distinction in The New Palgrave
Dictionary of Economics:
Goal independence refers to the central bank’s ability to determine the
goals of policy without the direct influence of the fiscal authority. In
the United Kingdom, the Bank of England lacks goal independence
since its inflation target is set by the government. In the United
States, the Federal Reserve’s goals are set in its legal charter, but
these goals are described in vague terms (for example, maximum
employment), leaving it to the Fed to translate these into operational
goals. Thus, the Fed has a high level of goal independence. Price
stability is mandated as the goal of the European Central Bank
(ECB), but the ECB can choose how to interpret this goal in terms of a
specific price index and definition of price stability.
Instrument independence refers only to the central bank’s ability to
freely adjust its policy tools in pursuit of the goals of monetary policy.
The Bank of England, while lacking goal independence, has
instrument independence; given the inflation goal mandated by the
government, it is able to set its instruments without influence from
the government. Similarly, the inflation target range for the Reserve
Bank of New Zealand is set in its Policy Targets Agreement (PTA)
with the government, but, given the PTA, the Reserve Bank has the
authority to sets [sic] its instruments without interference. The
Federal Reserve and the ECB have complete instrument
independence.96

Understanding this distinction is necessary to fully grasp the
extent of a monetary authority’s independence. Indeed, to a

Id.
Id.
Jeffrey Fuhrer, Central Bank Independence and Inflation Targeting: Monetary
Policy Paradigms for the Next Millennium?, NEW ENG. ECON. REV. 19, 22 (Jan.–Feb.
1997).
96 Carl E. Walsh, Central Bank Independence, in 1 THE NEW PALGRAVE DICTIONARY
OF ECONOMICS 729 (Steven N. Durlauf & Lawrence E. Blume eds., 2d ed. 2008).
93
94
95
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large degree it is more susceptible to legal analysis than de jure
and de facto independence to the extent that it can be more
readily determined by considering the legal framework and
founding documents of the central bank as an institution. The
murkiness of determining the extent of de jure and de facto
independence presents a variety of challenges that go far beyond
the scope of legal and statutory analysis. However, this is not to
say that determining the extent of goal independence, for
example, is without significant complexity and ambiguity.
Eggertsson and Le Borgne explored this topic at length in
their study, A Political Agency Theory of Central Bank
Independence,97 and though they drew strikingly novel
conclusions, they did not alter the basic distinction between these
two forms of independence. Specifically, the authors focused on
the following question: “Why would an office-motivated politician
spontaneously decide to delegate his monetary policy prerogative
to an independent but accountable central bank?”98 The great
novelty of their study, though, is in their refusal to rely on the
inflation bias to support their conclusion of lower interest rates,
noting that “all agents have the same (imperfect) information.”99
Indeed, they propose that a politician’s delegation of monetary
policy to an independent central banker with certain minimum
assurance of job security, including job tenure, “enables the
central banker to commit more effort into the conduct of
monetary policy than an elected politician could ever afford to.
This extra effort translates in expectations, in better forecasts
and fewer policy mistakes, which increases social welfare.”100
Thus, they assert, it is in a politician’s “private” interest to make
such a delegation that is both instrument and goal
independent.101
However, the authors conclude that while “instrument
independence is welfare enhancing for society, goal independence
is not” as it “benefits the current majority of the population at
the expense of the future majority.”102 Considering the case of
the United States Federal Reserve, the authors note that the Fed
combines both instrument and goal independence. They continue
that the Board is clearly instrument independent and, given that
its “mandate is cast in very broad terms and covers conflicting
97 Gauti Eggertsson & Eric Le Borgne, A Political Agency Theory of Central Bank
Independence (IMF, Working Paper No. 03/144, 2003), available at http://www.imf.org/
external/pubs/ft/wp/2003/wp03144.pdf.
98 Id. at 38.
99 Id.
100 Id.
101 Id.
102 Id. at 39.
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tasks (to purse [sic] both ‘maximum employment’ and ‘stable
prices’),” its governing body interprets and assigns relative
weight among these objectives: i.e., it is goal independent.103
By using the example of the Federal Reserve, Eggertsson
and Le Borgne reveal the essence of the distinction. The Federal
Reserve is instrument independent in that it has complete
discretion over when and to what extent to make open market
operations and other decisions. Further, however, the authors
note that the malleability of the Federal Reserve’s mandate is so
broad that it can also be said to have goal independence.
III. CASE STUDIES
The following case studies are intended to illustrate several
of the factors described above. While not intended to be a
comprehensive analysis of the central banking structures
implemented in the analyzed countries, they are intended to give
the reader an overview of the central bank policies that have
been adopted in the region in order to get a sense of the larger
trends that have been in play in Latin America. Specifically, as
noted above, I will focus on specific constitutional or legislative
measures that outline the scope of the central banks’ de jure
sovereignty. In particular, I will focus on the distinction between
instrument and goal independence in analyzing the various
national central banking frameworks and the historical contexts
in which they have operated.104
A. Argentina
The Banco Central de la Republica Argentina (“BCRA”) was
founded in 1935.105 The new institution replaced the existing
currency board system, which had been in place in 1899.106
Article 3 of the bank’s originating Charter Act No. 24,144,
provides that the bank “shall primarily and essentially preserve
the value of currency,” and continues by noting that “[t]he
authorities of the [BCRA] shall involve, to this effect, the
regulation of the amount of money and lending within the
Id. at 6.
To this end, Luis Jácome’s breakdown of Central Bank Autonomy in Annex II of
his paper, supra note 9, was very helpful.
105 Banco Central de la Republica Argentina, Former Governors and the Executive
Branch, http://www.bcra.gov.ar/index_i.htm (follow “Institutional” hyperlink;; then follow
“History and Heritage” hyperlink;; then follow “Former Governors and the Executive
Branch” hyperlink) (last visited Nov. 1, 2009).
106 Banco Central de la Republica Argentina, The BCRA and its History,
http://www.bcra.gov.ar/index_i.htm (follow “Institutional” hyperlink;; then follow “History
and Heritage” hyperlink;; then follow “The BCRA and its history” hyperlink) (last visited
Nov. 1, 2009).
103
104
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economic system and the formulation of monetary, financial and
exchange rules under the legislation in force.”107 Indeed, Article
3 goes on to explicitly announce that the bank shall act
independently of the Argentine President, noting, “[a]s regards
the preparation and implementation of a monetary and financial
policy, the [BCRA] shall not be subject to any order,
recommendation or instruction given by the National Executive
Power.”108
Chapter III of Charter Act No. 24,144 specifically addresses
issues relating to the tenure and compensation of members of the
Board of Directors. Article 7 provides that “[t]he president, vice
president and directors shall be appointed by the National
Executive Power in agreement with the Senate of the Nation;
they shall hold office for six (6) years and may be reappointed.”109
Further, the President may appoint members of the Board on an
interim basis awaiting the consent of the Argentine Senate.110 As
to the compensation paid to members of the Board, the Charter
Act provides that this shall be left to the Board, noting, “[t]he
fees of the president, vice president and directors shall be
determined according to the [BCRA] budget.”111 Though the
budget must be published at regular intervals and members of
the Board can be punished for failing to meet this announcement
requirement, the Board is left with the discretion of how to
control the BCRA’s budget.112
Finally, Article 9 of the Charter Act provides for the process
under which members of the Board may be removed.113 The
process is specifically outlined as follows:
The National Executive Power shall decree, after consultation with a
committee set up by the Honourable National Congress, the dismissal
of any member of the Board of directors on account of misconduct or
non-compliance with his duties as public servant. The Committee
shall be chaired by the President of the Senate and shall be composed
of both the president of the Budget and Treasury Committee and the
president of the Economy Committee of the Senate and of both the
president of the Budget and Treasury Committee and the president of
the Finance Committee of the Lower House.114

107 Carta Orgánica del Banco de la República Argentina, Ley 24.144, art. 3 (1992),
available at http://www.bcra.gov.ar/pdfs/marco/Carta_Organica.PDF (Spanish version).
108 Id.
109 Id. at art. 7.
110 Id.
111 Id.
112 Id. at art. 3.
113 Id. at art. 9.
114 Id.
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The removal power retained by the Argentine Senate and
President would seem to be quite broad, given that it merely
takes a decree issued by the executive and approval by the
Senate.
Further, the specific scope of what constitutes a
removable offense was left extremely broad. However, there is
not much evidence of abuse in the past. Even during the
tumultuous economic collapse experienced by Argentina in 2001,
only one member of the Board, Dr. Pedro Pou, was removed.115
B. Chile
The Banco Central de Chile (“BCC”) was founded in 1925,
eight years prior to the BCRA, on the basis of recommendations
made by a commission headed by Edwin Walter Kemmerer,
professor of economics at the University of Princeton.116 The
projects proposed by the Kemmerer Commission included the
monetary law “which sought to stabilize the value of Chile’s
currency and the gold standard as the basis of the country’s
monetary unit, the creation of the Central Bank of Chile, the
passing of the general banking law and the general budget
law.”117
Title I, Section 3 of Law 18,840, titled the Basic
Constitutional Act of the Central Bank of Chile (“Basic
Constitutional Act”), defines the scope of the BCC’s objectives.118
Similar to the BCRA, the Basic Constitutional Act provides that
“[t]he Bank shall have as its purposes to look after the stability of
the currency.”119
However, in addition to the basic antiinflationary authority that the BCC shares with the BCRA, the
BCRA also has the responsibility of overseeing “the normal
functioning of internal and external payments.”120 The Basic
Constitutional Act also provides that, in striving to achieve these
objectives, “[t]he authority of the Bank . . . shall include that of
regulating the amount of currency and credit in circulation, the
performance of credit transactions and foreign exchange, as well
as the issuance of regulatory provisions regarding monetary,
credit, financing and foreign exchange matters.”121

115 David Fuhr & Zachary Klughaupt, The IMF and AGOA: A Comparative Analysis
of Conditionality, 14 DUKE J. COMP. INT’L L. 125, 130 (2004).
116 Banco
Central de Chile, Origin of the Central Bank of Chile,
http://www.bcentral.cl/eng/about/functions/index.htm (last visited Nov. 1, 2009).
117 Id.
118 Ley Orgánica Constitucional del Banco Central de Chile, as amended, Diario
Oficial, art. 3, sec. 3, 5 de enero de 2006 (Chile), available at http://www.bcentral.cl/
publicaciones/normativas/pdf/leyorganica102006.pdf.
119 Id.
120 Id.
121 Id.
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In terms of the degree of oversight by the Legislative and
Executive branches of Chile, the Basic Constitutional Act
requires that the BCC “inform” the political branches of a range
of decisions.122 In particular, Section 4 provides the following:
The Bank shall inform the President of the Republic and the Senate
with regard to the policies and regulations of general applicability
issued by the Bank in the performance of its duties. Likewise, it shall
advise the President of the Republic, upon his request, in all matters
within the scope of its duties.123

Interestingly, under Section 6 of the Basic Constitutional Act
“the supervision and administration of the Bank shall be vested
in the Board of the Central Bank, which shall be responsible for
the exercise of the authority and the carrying out of the duties
entrusted to the Bank by law.”124 However, Section 6 continues
with a seemingly important caveat: “When passing its
resolutions, the Board shall consider the general orientation of
the Government’s economic policies.”125 Depending on the scope
of its application, this caveat would seemingly limit the extent of
the bank’s independence, especially when compared to the more
absolute bar on executive interference provided in the Argentine
case.
The appointment of members of the Board, governed by
Section 7 of the Basic Constitutional Act, occurs with “the prior
approval of the Senate, by means of an executive decree issued
through the Ministry of Finance.”126 Unlike the Argentine case,
the Chilean Basic Constitution does not provide for interim
appointments, through which the Executive could, though
temporarily, expand his or her influence on the Board. Section 8
provides that members’ terms shall last 10 years, and are
renewable.127 The Chairman of the Bank, whose term as Chair
lasts five years (or the remainder of his term on the Board, if
shorter) is appointed at the sole discretion of the Chilean
President.128
Another notable difference with the BCRA’s
structure appears in Section 10, and relates to compensation of
board members.129 Whereas in the Argentine case, the Board of
the BCRA establishes its own compensation levels, which it must
publish, the Basic Constitutional Act provides the following:

122
123
124
125
126
127
128
129

Id. at sec. 4.
Id.
Id. at sec. 6.
Id.
Id. at sec. 7.
Id. at sec. 8.
Id.
Id. at sec. 10.
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Compensation for the Governor, the Vice-Governor and the Board
Members shall be set forth by the President of the Republic for periods
not to exceed two years. For such purposes, the President of the
Republic shall appoint, with the anticipation as may be necessary, a
Committee formed by three persons who are former Governors and
Vice-Governors of the Bank, who shall present a compensation
proposal based upon the salaries being paid by the private sector
banking institutions to their top executives.130

Though the Basic Constitutional Act leaves a wide degree of
discretion in the hands of the Chilean President in terms of the
compensation of board members, it simultaneously attempts to
make the process somewhat more objective through the
requirement that the President institute a commission to make
compensation proposals.
As opposed to the Argentine case, however, the BCC’s
requirements for the dismissal of board members is somewhat,
though marginally, more stringent. Section 17 of the Basic
Constitutional Act provides that “[t]he President of the Republic
by justified reason and the prior approval of the Senate may
remove any or all of the Board Members.”131 The requirement
that the President’s actions be justified is more clearly defined
subsequently:
The dismissal may only be based upon the grounds that the concerned
Board Member has voted in favor of Bank resolutions representing a
material and clear breach of the purposes of the Bank as specified in
the first paragraph of Section 3, and provided that said resolution has
been the main and direct cause of a material damage to the economy
of the country.132

Clearly, the primary distinction between this and the Argentine
case is the high bar set for the seriousness of the offenses that
the member of the board must be charged with by the President.
Additionally, and interestingly not specified in the Argentine
case, the Chilean Basic Constitutional Act also requires that
“[t]he Board Member or Members concerned shall have the right
of a hearing before the Senate.”133 The seemingly higher and
more specific requirements for the alleged act, in addition to the
right of a hearing before the Senate would seem to make the task
of removing a member from the Board somewhat more
challenging for Chilean political officers.

130
131
132
133
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Id. at sec. 17.
Id.
Id.
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C. Mexico
The Banco de Mexico, Mexico’s central bank, was also
founded in 1925, and finds its underpinnings in the Mexican
Constitution.134 It was not until 1931 that the Ley Monetaria de
los Estados Unidos de Mexicanos was passed which provided
much greater guidance in the actual operations of the bank,
rather than the general terms of the Mexican Constitution.135
Nevertheless, Article 28 of the Constitution specifies many, if not
most, of the basic governing principles for the Bank, including its
central objective and several limitations.136 First, Article 28
begins with an explicit call for the creation of the central bank
and the requirement that it be independent: “The State shall
have a central bank, which shall be autonomous in exercising its
function and management.”137 Later in Article 28, there appears
the specific proviso that “No authority shall order the central
bank to grant financing.”138
Article 28 then defines the scope of the Banco de Mexico’s
objective, noting that it “will be to foster the stability of the
national currency’s purchasing power, therefore strengthening
the State’s role in guiding the country’s development.”139
Comparing this provision of Article 28 to the previous examples
we have considered can be quite revealing. For example, neither
the Argentine nor the Chilean central banks are specifically
given the additional objective of “guiding the country’s
development.”140 Indeed, in both of the earlier cases, the
authorizing legislation focused on the objective of price stability.
Although, based on the text of the Article, the “development”
objective would seem to be secondary to the primary objective of
price stability, its inclusion is nevertheless notable. One might
draw a comparison to the vague terms used to outline the
objectives of the United States Federal Reserve. It was noted
earlier that these vague terms, and the additional discretion that
they imparted on the Federal Reserve, have enhanced its
134 Banco de Mexico, History of the Mexican Banknote, http://www.banxico.org.mx/
sitioingles/billetesymonedas/didactico/notesManufactFeaturesHistory/
historyMexicanNotes.html (last visited, Nov. 1, 2009).
135 Ley Monetaria de los Estados Unidos de Mexicanos, Diario Oficial de la Federación
[D.O.], 27 de julio de 1931 (Mex.), available at http://www.diputados.gob.mx/
LeyesBiblio/pdf/152.pdf.
136 Constitución Política de los Estados Unidos Mexicanos [Const.], as amended,
Diario Oficial de la Federación [D.O.], art. 28, 5 de febrero de 1917 (Mex.) [hereinafter
Constitución Política de los Estados Unidos Mexicanos].
137 Id.
138 Id.
139 Id.
140 For a discussion on the banking policies of Argentina see supra Part III. A. For a
discussion on the banking policies of Chile see supra Part III.B.
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independence from political actors by increasing its goal of
independence.141 While the terms of the Mexican Constitution
would seem not to be subject to as broad an interpretation, they
nevertheless would presumably allow for a broader range of
action than either the Argentine or Chilean cases.
As is the case in both Chile and Argentina, the members of
the bank’s board are appointed by the President, subject to
confirmation “by the Senate or, should it be the case, by the
Permanent Commission.”142 Addressing the tenure of board
members, Article 28 provides that “[t]hey shall discharge their
office by periods, in line with the autonomous exercise of their
functions.”143 On this point, Article 40 of the Ley de Banco de
Mexico provides much clarification and specificity:
The Governor will be appointed for a term of six years and Deputy
Governors for eight years. The term of the Governor will start on the
first of January of the fourth year of the President of the Republic’s
term. The terms of the Deputy Governors will be staggered, with one
starting every other year on the first of January of the first, third and
fifth years of the President’s term. The individuals occupying these
posts may be appointed members of the Board of Governors for more
than one term.144

Thus, although the Governor of the Banco de Mexico is appointed
from among the existing members of the board at the sole
discretion of the Mexican President, the terms of the board’s
members are staggered to end every other year throughout the
President’s term. As the President of Mexico is limited to a
single 6-year term, he or she would be limited to appointing no
more than three members of the 5-member board, barring
retirements.
Interestingly, the Mexican Constitution and Ley de Banco de
Mexico establish a very high bar for the removal of members of
the board. The Constitution provides the following:
They shall only be removed by grave causes and they cannot hold any
other position or job, except those in which they act on behalf of the
bank or those honorary related with teaching, scientific, cultural, or
charity associations. The people in charge of the direction of the
central bank may be subject to impeachment in accordance with the
provisions set forth in Article 110 of this Constitution.145

See supra note 103 and accompanying text.
Constitución Política de los Estados Unidos Mexicanos, supra note 136, at art. 28.
Id.
Ley de Banco de Mexico, as amended, Diario Oficial de la Federación [D.O.], art.
40, 23 de deciembre de 1993 (Mex.) [hereinafter Ley de Banco de Mexico].
145 Constitución Política de los Estados Unidos Mexicanos, supra note 136, at art. 28.
141
142
143
144
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Article 43 of the Ley de Banco de Mexico, provides the following
list of actions which would be sufficient to justify removal:
I. Mental illness, as well as physical affliction preventing the
adequate fulfillment of their functions for more than six months;
II. Performing any job, position or commission other than those
provided for in Article 28 Paragraph Seven of the Constitution;
III. Stop being a Mexican citizen or fulfilling any of the requirements
set forth under Article 39 Section III;
IV. Failure to observe the agreements sanctioned by the Board of
Governors or deliberately acting in excess or in dereliction of his
duties;
V. Using the confidential information available to him or her as a
result of his or her position in his or her own benefit or that of third
parties, or disclosing said information without the consent of the
Board of Governors;
VI. Knowingly submitting false information for the consideration of
the Board of Governors, and
VII. Leaving his or her post without authorization from the Board of
Governors or without justified motive, baring force majeure. The
Board of Governors cannot authorize leave of absence for more than
six months.146

It should be noted that this list of possible offenses is far more
specific than any of the others, and would seemingly make
removal of a board member more difficult. This is especially
true, however, when one considers the complexity of the process
which must also be undergone in order to facilitate this removal.
This process, outlined beginning in Article 44 of the Ley de Banco
de Mexico, involves several steps before even the impeachment
stage may be reached. First, a majority of the Board, excluding
the member in question, must come to a verdict that at least one
of the conditions outlined in Article 43 have been met.147 The
accused member must be accorded a hearing in this process.148
Once such a verdict has been issued, it must be sent to the
President, along with “the documentary evidence supporting it
and the written argumentation the affected party may have
presented in his or her own defense.”149 Article 44 then requires
that “[t]he Federal Executive shall in turn send it, together with
the aforementioned documentation and the President’s
considerations on the admissibility or inadmissibility of the
removal, to the Senate or, should the latter not be in session, to

146
147
148
149

Ley de Banco de Mexico, supra note 144, at art. 43.
Id. at art. 44.
Id.
Id.
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the Permanent Commission, for a final judgment.”150 This final
judgment must follow the ordinary, more rigorous (though
arguably not as rigorous as in the United States), process for
impeachment provided for in the Constitution.151
III. THE CASE OF VENEZUELA
A. The Banco Central de Venezuela
First established in 1939, the last of the central bank
institutions that we will discuss in greater detail, the Banco
Central de Venezuela (“BCV”), was created in the wake of the
twenty-seven year dictatorship of Juan Vicente Gomez.152 As
part of the general upheaval of that era in Venezuelan history,
the new government adopted a novel national economic plan
called the February Program, which implemented a wide range of
economic reforms, including the foundation of the Central
Bank.153 The first major reforms to this new system were put in
place in the 1960s and were followed by additional reforms in the
1990s, the latter of which gave the BCV administrative
autonomy.154
The most recent reforms to the BCV were
implemented in 2001.155
The primary legal framework for the BCV is derived from
the Venezuelan Constitution and Ley del Banco Central de
Venezuela.156 The Venezuelan Constitution, passed in 2001 with
the sponsorship of Hugo Chavez, only briefly addresses the
establishment of a central bank, though it does note that “the
monetary competence of National Power shall necessarily be
exercised exclusively by the Venezuelan Central Bank.”157
Though this would appear to be a fairly comprehensive
statement of the scope of the BCV’s power, several caveats are
subsequently added. These provisos are largely veiled references
to various aspects of Mr. Chavez’s socialist Bolivarian agenda.
For example, while it is repeated later in Article 318 that the
BCV “is a public-law juridical person with autonomy to formulate
and implement policies within its sphere of competence,” the
Id.
Constitución Política de los Estados Unidos Mexicanos, supra note 136, at art. 28.
Banco Central de Venezuela, History of the BCV, http://www.bcv.org.ve/
EnglishVersion/c3/index.asp?secc=history (last visited Nov. 1, 2009).
153 Id.
154 Id.
155 Id.
156 Ley del Banco Central de Venezuela [Law on the Central Bank of Venezuela], as
amended, Publicada en Gaceta Oficial, 3 de octubre de 2001(Ven.) [hereinafter Ley del
Banco Central de Venezuela].
157 Constitución de la Républica Bolivariana de Venezuela, [Const.], as amended,
Publicada en Gaceta Oficial, art. 318, 30 de Diciembre de 1999 (Ven.).
150
151
152
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Constitution includes the additional requirement that the bank
“perform its functions in coordination with general economic
policy, in the interest of attaining the higher objectives of the
State and the Nation.”158 What exactly would be included among
these “higher objectives” is, not surprisingly, left deeply unclear,
though one might fairly assume that it is a reference to Mr.
Chavez’s “Bolivarian” Revolution.
Interestingly, and
undoubtedly in concession to the monetary policy implications of
his regional agenda, Article 318 includes the following, highly
unusual caveat: “In the event a common currency is instituted
within the framework of Latin American and Caribbean
integration, it shall be permissible to adopt the currency provided
for by a treaty signed by the Republic.”159 Mr. Chavez’s populism
frequently incorporates a marked emphasis on regional
cooperation against the perceived hegemony of the United States,
which he labels “imperial.”160
As to the responsibilities of the BCV and scope of its purpose,
Article 318 provides that “[t]he fundamental objective of the
Venezuelan Central Bank is to achieve price stability and
preserve the internal and foreign exchange value of the monetary
unit.”161
In order to achieve these objectives, Article 318
continues, the functions of the BCV “shall include those of
formulating and implementing monetary policy, participating in
the design of and implementing foreign exchange policy, currency
regulation, credit and interest rate, administrating international
reserves and any others established by law.”162
As to the selection of the board of the BCV, Article 16 of the
Ley del Banco Central de Venezuela provides that the Executive
“shall be responsible for the designation of the President and four
(4) Directors of the Bank.”163 Only the nomination of the
President must be approved by the Venezuelan Senate, not the
nomination of the other four directors.164 Further, one of the
President’s nominees must be a “Minister of the economic
cabinet,” though it cannot be the Finance Minister.165 In
addition, the National Assembly must designate the two (2)
remaining Directors by a majority vote.166 In order to remove a
member from the Board, similar to the process provided for in
158
159
160
161
162
163
164
165
166

Id.
Id.
Watch Venezuela, WASH. POST, Nov.24, 2008, at A18.
Id.
Id.
Ley del Banco Central de Venezuela, supra note 156, at art. 16.
Id. at art. 9.
Id. at art. 15.
Id. at art. 16.

Do Not Delete

92

2/6/2010 1:03 PM

Chapman Law Review

[Vol. 13:63

Mexico, either the President or two members of the Board must
initiate a removal proceeding.167 However, in Venezuela, a twothirds majority of the National Assembly of Representatives is
required to remove the Board member.168
B. The Terms of the Amendment and its Implications
As noted above, the Reforma proposed by Hugo Chavez in
2007 would have caused a substantial change in way the nation
conducted its monetary policy. While many observers had
questioned the de facto independence of the BCV, one can only
wonder what the complete abandonment of nearly all de jure
standards of independence would have entailed. Indeed, the
proposed amendments did not even seek to maintain the
appearance of independence for the BCV; they sought to make
the institution utterly subservient to the national executive.
From its very opening, the proposed revision to Article 318
required that the “national monetary system must incline to the
benefit of the essential objectives of the Socialist State and the
well-being of the people, over any other consideration.”169 The

Id. at art. 26.
Id.
La Reforma, supra note 8. The original text, in Spanish, of Article 318 of La
Reforma reads as follows:
Artículo 318. El sistema monetario nacional debe propender al logro de los
fines esenciales del Estado Socialista y el bienestar del pueblo, por encima de
cualquier otra consideración.
El Poder Ejecutivo Nacional, a través del Banco Central de Venezuela, en
estricta y obligatoria coordinación, fijará las políticas monetarias y ejercerá las
competencias monetarias del Poder Nacional. El objetivo específico del Banco
Central de Venezuela, como ente del Poder Ejecutivo Nacional, es lograr las
condiciones monetarias, cambiarias y financieras necesarias para promover el
crecimiento y el desarrollo económico y social de la Nación. La unidad
monetaria de la República Bolivariana de Venezuela es el bolívar. En caso de
que se instituya una moneda común en el marco de la integración
latinoamericana y caribeña, podrá adoptarse la moneda que sea objeto de los
tratados que suscriba la República.
El Banco Central de Venezuela es persona de derecho público sin autonomía
para la formulación y el ejercicio de las políticas correspondientes, y sus
funciones estarán supeditadas a la política económica general y al Plan de
Desarrollo Integral de la Nación para alcanzar los objetivos superiores del
Estado Socialista y la mayor suma de felicidad posible para todo el pueblo.
Para el adecuado cumplimiento de su objetivo específico, el Banco Central de
Venezuela tendrá entre sus funciones, compartidas con el Poder Ejecutivo
Nacional, las de participar en la formulación y ejecución de la política
monetaria, en el diseño y ejecución de la política cambiaria, en la regulación de
la moneda, el crédito y fijación de las tasas de interés.
Las reservas internacionales de la República serán manejadas por el Banco
Central de Venezuela bajo la administración y dirección del Presidente o
Presidenta de la República, como administrador o administradora de la
Hacienda Pública Nacional.
167
168
169
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very next sentence would have put the final nail in the coffin of
central bank independence in Venezuela: “The National
Executive Power, through Banco Central de Venezuela, acting in
strict and obligatory coordination, will determine the monetary
policies and will exert the monetary authority of the National
Power.”170 This remarkable sentence would have converted the
autonomous BCV into nothing more than a mere mechanism of
Venezuelan Presidential power. Requiring “strict and obligatory
coordination” of the BCV would have likely stripped the longstanding institution of nearly all discretion.
Indeed, Mr. Chavez did not stop his complete restructuring
of the BCV at a redefinition of its instrumental independence, he
also significantly changed the objectives that the institution was
organized to achieve. Recall that the BCV, under Mr. Chavez’s
own 2001 Constitution, was charged with the usual Central Bank
objective of price stability.171 The Revised Article 318 reflected in
La Reforma was as follows: “The specific objective of the BCV,
just as that of the National Executive Power, is to obtain the
monetary, exchange and financial conditions necessary to
promote the growth and the economic and social development of
the Nation.”172 That this statement is at once inconsistent with
the objectives usually assigned to central banks and deeply
populist in tenor does not come as a surprise given Mr. Chavez’s
idiosyncratic style. As if to remove any doubt from the equation,
the Revised Article 318 continued as follows:
The BCV is person of public right without autonomy for the
formulation and the exercise of the corresponding policies, and its
functions will be submitted to the general economic policy and the
Plan of Integral Development of the Nation to reach the greater
objectives of the Socialist State and the greater sum of possible
happiness after all the people.173

Finally, and perhaps tying all of the various pieces of this
“reform” together, the Revised Article 318 would have provided
that “[t]he international reserves of the Republic shall be
managed by the Central Bank of Venezuela under the
administration and direction of the President of the Republic, as
administrator of the National Public Treasury.”174 It is arguably
in light of this final provision that one might begin to grasp the
full breadth of Mr. Chavez’s intentions. Many observers noted

170
171
172
173
174

Id.
See supra note 161 and accompanying text.
Id.
Id.
Id.
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that this amendment would essentially “allow the president to
use the country’s reserves as he saw fit.”175
The stakes were ultimately much higher than the mere
question of central bank independence—they related to the very
nature of the BCV. Mr. Chavez’s amendments so broadly defined
the scope of the nation’s monetary policy, essentially conflating
the BCV’s objectives with the advancement of his “Bolivarian”
Revolution, such that the BCV would cease to be merely a
monetary authority. It would become at once, a slush fund for
Mr. Chavez’s regional, political, and military ambitions, not to
mention his domestic development goals. A central bank that
transforms into a development and relief agency has ceased to be
a central bank.
Indeed, there is precedent for this in Venezuela. Such an
instance of mixed purposes and the use of a state entity geared
towards other purposes can be found in the case of Venezuela’s
national oil company, Petroleos de Venezuela (“PDVSA”). Since
becoming President of Venezuela, Mr. Chavez has used PDVSA’s
resources as personal political capital. He has brokered regional
energy and pipeline arrangements with allies such as Argentina’s
Nestor and Cristina Kirchner.176 In fact, months before facing
his own election, Chavez was embroiled in a scandal when a
Venezuelan-American businessman was caught entering
Argentina on a private flight with PDVSA officials and $800,000
hidden in a suitcase, which was allegedly to be used to illegally
support the campaign of Cristina Fernandez de Kirchner
Wilson.177 Beyond the regional political motives towards which
Mr. Chavez has employed PDVSA’s assets, he has also used
billions of dollars of the company’s resources to fund vast social
programs.178 All the while, the once-heralded company has been
crumbling due to the fact that basic investments on maintenance
have floundered, resulting in inactive oil rigs and falling
production.179
While PDVSA’s example over the last decade is hardly one
that merits emulation, the fundamental madness of Mr. Chavez’s
proposals to take over the nation’s central bank was in the fact
Editorial, Saying No to Chávez, N.Y. TIMES, December 1, 2007, at A14.
Jack Chang, Chavez Uses Oil Revenue to Win Support in Latin America, CENTRE
DAILY TIMES (State College, PA), March 12, 2006, at A12.
177 Chris Carlson, Argentina Seeks Extradition in Case of Briefcase Scandal,
VENEZUELANALYSIS.COM, Aug. 30, 2007, available at http://www.venezuelanalysis.com/
news/2575.
178 Cesar J. Alvarez, Venezuela’s Oil-Based Economy, COUNCIL ON FOREIGN REL., Feb.
9, 2009, available at http://www.cfr.org/publication/12089.
179 Editorial, Chavez: A Decade of Disaster, LATIN BUS. CHRON., Feb. 9, 2009,
available at http://www.latinbusinesschronicle.com/app/article.aspx?id=3138.
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that his intentions seemed to have been to baldly duplicate the
PVDSA experiment, writ-large.
C. Aftershocks
As illustrated earlier, although Mr. Chavez’s 2007
Amendments ultimately failed to pass, the history of this episode
did not end there.180 While in the euphoria of the moment, one of
the leaders of the opposition to Chavez, Manuel Rosales,
celebrated “a new path, a democratic path,” there can be no doubt
that much has changed in the following year.181 Indeed, in his
press conference immediately after the results were announced,
he noted that the 51 percent to 49 percent defeat was
“microscopic.”182 He added, perhaps ominously at the time,
though perceptively, “[t]o use a phrase from February 1992,
we’ve fallen short for now.”183 It was only days after the election
before news sources began to report that speculation was
beginning to mount about how and when Chavez will attempt to
push some of the failed reforms into law, whether unilaterally by
decree or through the National Assembly, which he dominates.184
In the year since, much of this has come to pass. By August
2008, Mr. Chavez had implemented many of the Amendments he
had sought to pass the previous year by invoking a sweeping new
decree power that had been granted to him by the National
Assembly.185 At the time, he seemed to allude to this new
method of implementing his established (and rejected) ideas: “At
this point, I’m thinking of presenting a new formula, to expand
and launch a new perspective, to raise the speed of the process,”
Chavez noted.186 Perhaps most famously, however, in February
2009 Mr. Chavez won a referendum to amend the constitution
that lifts the previous two-term limit and ensures he will be able
to continue his “socialist revolution’’ for as long as he retains the
support of the electorate.187 Arguably, given his success in
accomplishing much of his rejected reforms, it is only a matter of
time before he once again raises the issue of his access to

See supra Part III.B.
John Otis, Chavez Power Play Defeated: Opposition Leader Says Nation is on ‘a
New Path, a Democratic Path’, HOUSTON CHRON., Dec. 3, 2007, at A1.
182 Jonathan Gurwitz, Despot's Loss Doesn't Mean he Won't Try Again Soon, SAN
ANTONIO EXPRESS-NEWS, Dec. 5, 2007, at 11B.
183 Id.
184 Daniel Cancel, Venezuela's Chávez Presses on Undaunted, CHRISTIAN SCI.
MONITOR, Dec. 6, 2007, at 10.
185 Editorial, Chavez's Way, LOS ANGELES TIMES, August 9, 2008, at A18.
186 Id.
187 Jeremy McDermott, Chávez Wins Right to Rule Again, DAILY TELEGRAPH
(London), Feb. 17, 2009, at 18.
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national reserves and the independence of his nation’s central
bank.
CONCLUSION
The issue of central bank independence has figured very
prominently in Latin America’s economic policy debates over the
last several decades. While it seemed for some time, especially
during the 1990s that the momentum had finally swung in favor
of greater autonomy in monetary decision making in this region
which had for so long suffered from intermittent
hyperinflationary contagion, it now seems that the opposing
camp has once again pitched its tents and is preparing for battle.
Though the populist forces, most clearly represented by
Venezuela’s Hugo Chavez, have thus far been unable to do away
with central bank autonomy due to resistance on the part of their
populace, this has not been for a lack of trying and there is
reason to believe they will try again.
Indeed, for a region that has repeatedly suffered the
consequences of destructive economic policy, it would seem that
once again the barbarians are at the gate. As Professor Larrain
warned, “[t]he true risk of high inflation in Latin America lies in
populism. . . . Hyperinflation is not dead, it is merely
sleeping.”188
The unanswered question before us is whether the region’s
polities will follow the wisdom of Ulysses and tie themselves to
the mast of independent monetary decision making in order to
avoid the populist temptations of Latin America’s modern-day
Sirens or whether the great Latin American ships of state will
once again crash into the rocky shoals of hyperinflation.

188

Larrain, supra note 10.

